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RUBIN V. UNITED STATES: PLEDGE OF STOCK
AS COLLATERAL FOR A COMMERCIAL LOAN
IS A "SALE" OF A -SECURITY
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)' and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' provide a cause of action for frdudulent securities
transactions.3 In order to satisfy the subject matter jurisdiction re-
quirements of the federal anti-fraud securities laws, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the transaction sued upon involves a "sale"4 or a "pur-
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77111 (1976).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by nieans of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 15 U.S.C. §
77q(a) (1976).
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or Instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission under section 10b of the
1934 Act, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
() To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(14) (1976). The 1933 Act defines a "sale"
as "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security for value." 15
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chase"5 of a security. The determination whether a transaction involves
a "sale or purchase" is difficult because the definitional sections of the
1933 and 1934 Acts are broad and ambiguous.' The difficulties commonly
arise in cases involving a pledge of stock as collateral for a commercial
loan.' The Supreme Court, however, recently held in Rubin v. United
U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976). Under the 1934 Act, a sale includes "any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(14) (1976). Courts construe the two definitions as functional
equivalents. See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing
National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co. 583 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir.
1978)).
1 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(13) (1976). Under the 1934 Act, a "purchase" includes "any con-
tract to buy, purchase or otherwise acquire." Id. The 1933 Act does not contain a definition
of "purchase." Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1979).
If a court holds that there is no sale or purchase, no federal subject matter jurisdiction
exists. See National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295,
1298-1300 (5th Cir. 1978). A-plaintiff must then seek relief under state "blue sky" laws or
state common law. See, e.g., 3 VA. CODE §§ 13.1-13.1-574 (1978 Repl. Vol.). See generally L.
Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW (1958). Plaintiffs prefer to seek relief under the federal
securities laws because of certain advantages inherent in the federal anti-fraud provisions.
See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1OB-5, § 11.01 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS];
Note, Securities Regulation-Antifraud Provisions, 11 CuM. L. REV. 237, 241 n.29 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Securities Regulation]; Note, Rule 10b-5: The Circuits Debate the Ex-
clusiv.ity of Remedies, the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, and Constructive Deception, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 889 n.95 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Debate]. The advantages of
federal laws include nationwide venue and service of process, relaxed privity requirements,
more liberal procedural rules, the elimination or modification of the traditional elements of
common law fraud under the federal law. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730-31 (9th
Cir. 1974); Comment, The Pledge and the Purchase and Sale Requirement of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, 65 GEO L.J. 1593, 1594 n.5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pledge and Purchase
and Sale Requirement].
' See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1977) (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)).
' See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d
1295, 1298-1300 (5th Cir. 1978); Rispo v. Spring Lake Mews, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 462, 466-68
(E.D. Pa. 1980). The issue whether a sale of a security is present also occurs in cases
concerning misappropriation of securities and the "sale" of promissory note. See, e.g., SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 1974) (delivery of a note in ex-
change for valuable consideration of a "sale"); Superintendent of Ins. v. Freedman, 443 F.
Supp. 628, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (misappropriation of money authorized to purchase securities
not a "purchase"); JACOBS, supra note 5, § 38.02.
A pledge is a bailment of personal property for the purpose of securing a loan or other
obligation. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 15.1 (3d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as BROWN]. In a pledge transaction, the person pledging the stock
(pledgor) retains legal title to the pledge property, and the person receiving the pledge
(pledgee) has possession of the pledged property as well as the right to dispose of the pro-
perty upon the pledgor's o default on the loan. Pledge and the Purchase and Sale Require-
ment, supra note 5, at 1593 n.1 (1977); Comment, Applicability of Rule 10b-5 to Pledges of
Securities, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 548 n.6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Applicability of Rule'
10b-5]. A pledge of stock commonly occurs when an individual or corporation obtains a loan
and pledges shares of stock to the lender as collateral for the loan. See Pledge and the Pur-
chase and Sale Requirement, supra note 5, at 1593; Comment, Pledged Securities- The
Pledgee's Duty to Preserve Value Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 MARQ. L. REV.
391, 391 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Pledgee's Duty].
[Vol. XXXVIII
RUBIN V. UNITED STATES
States' that pledges of stock as loan collateral satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.'
Prior to Rubin, courts have applied either a literal statutory ap-
proach10 or a title analysis1 in determining whether a pledge of stock as
collateral for a loan constitutes a sale of a security. Courts using a title
analysis consistently determine that a pledge of stock is not a sale. 2
Under the title analysis, a sale occurs when title to the stock is transfer-
red from the pledgor to the pledgee." In an unforeclosed pledge of stock-,
101 S. Ct. 698 (1981).
101 S. Ct. at 701.
10 See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1029 (6th Cir. 1979); Mallis
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 928
(1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381 (1978); United States v. Gen-
tile, 530 F.2d 461, 466-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976). In Mansbach, the plain-
tiff alleged that a broker-dealer converted his corporate bonds which had been pledged as
collateral for securities. 598 F.2d at 1021. The Mansbach court, noting a split of authority on
the issue whether a pledge of stock constitutes a sale of a security, adopted the literal
statutory view and held that the pledge did not constitute a sale. Id. 1029.
Gentile involved a criminal prosecution for conspiracy to violate federal securities laws
and violation of securities laws arising from the pledge of wrongfully completed stock certi-
ficates. 530 F.2d at 463. The Second Circuit noted that a disposition of an interest in a
security had occurred and therefore a sale was present. Id. at 466. The Mallis court relied
on the statutory language of the 1934 Act and held that a pledge of stock disposes of an in-
terest in a security. 568 F.2d at 829-30. The court construed the pledge as a sale, thereby
providing the necessary subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 830.
" See National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295,
1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1978); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, Tex., 597 F.2d 490, 496
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975). In McClure, plaintiff was one-half owner of
Gains County Development (GCD). 497 F.2d at 491. Plaintiffs ex-husband, also a half-owner
of GCD, obtained plaintiffs consent to a 200,000 dollar loan on behalf of GCD, the proceeds
of which were used to pay off personal debts. Id. at 492. In refinancing the loan, plaintiff
pledged GCD stock as collateral for the loan. The bank foreclosed on the corporation's land,
rendering plaintiffs stock worthless. Plaintiff brought an action under § 10(b) of the
1934 Act and rule 10b-5, alleging fraud in the sale of the securities. Using the title analysis,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the suit on the alternative ground
that an unforeclosed pledge of stock as collateral did not constitute a sale under section
10(b). The court held that title to the stock must change hands to constitute a sale. Since an
unforeclosed stock pledge does not transfer title, the court maintained the transaction did
not constitute a sale. Id. at 496. The court further noted that the pledge transaction had no
effect on the securities industry, and is therefore outside the purview of the federal
securities acts. Id. at 495.
The defendant insurance company in National Bank pledged worthless stock as col-
lateral for a 2.5 million dollar loan. 583 F.2d at 1297. Ultimately, the insurance company
went bankrupt, resulting in a 1,450,000 dollar loss for plaintiff bank. Id. The Fifth Circuit
held that the unforeclosed pledge of stock did not constitute a sale under § 10(b) of the
1934 Act and dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction under the title analysis. Id.
at 1302. The court's rationale for the decision is that an unforeclosed transaction does not
transfer title to the stock and does not affect the rights and privileges of the parties involv-
ed. Id.
" See note 11 supra.
IS See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, Tex., 497 F.2d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 1974).
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title to the stock remains in the pledgor.' The pledgor retains all rights
and privileges in the stock even though the pledgee has actual posses-
sion of the stock.15 Since title to the stock does not pass to the pledgee,
no sale of a security occurs under the title analysis.16
Under the literal statutory approach, courts closely scrutinize the
statutory language of the securities acts' definitional sections."' The
definition of a "sale" in the 1933 Act includes any disposition of an inter-
est in a security. 8 Since the transfer of any interest will satisfy the
definitional requirements, the "sale" definition eliminates the require-
ment that title to the stock pass from the pledgor to the pledgee for a
sale to occur. 19 In a pledge, the delivery of stock to the pledgee con-
stitutes the dispostion of an interest in a security since the delivery
gives the pledgee a perfected security interest in the stock." Under the
literal statutory analysis, therefore, a pledge constitutes a "sale" of a
security.
Courts employing the title and statutory analyses consider the im-
pact of pledge transactions on the implementation of the legislative pur-
pose of the federal securities laws.21 Although both analyses recognize
that the purpose of the Acts are to protect investors, the analyses reach
14 Id. In McClure, the Fifth Circuit noted that a pledge could qualify as a sale upon
foreclosure of the stock. Id. at 495. If a bank forecloses and sells unregistered stocks, the
transaction would qualify as a sale and impose underwriter liability on the seller-bank. See
National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th
Cir. 1978); SEC v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 359 F. Supp. 219, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1973); SEC v. National
Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444, 456 (N.D. Tex. 1971), affd, 477 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.
1973). See also Bosse v. Crowell, Collier and MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1977).
See generally Note, A Pledge of Stock in a Commercial Loam "Purchase or Sale" Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 669.
" See note 7 supra; National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co.,
583 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978). A pledgor of stock retains the right to sell the stock, vote
the stock, receive dividends, and remains liable for ad valorem taxes. See Applicability of
Rule 10b-5, supra note 7, at 548 n.6.
See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, Tex., 497 F.2d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 589 F.2d 1017, 1029 (6th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1976); notes 3-5 supra.
18 See notes 3 & 4 supra.
" See United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1976); text accompanying
note 13 supra.
2 See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1978 version). Under § 9-105(g) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the pledged stock certificates constitute "instruments." U.C.C. § 9-105(i) (1978 ver-
sion). Thus, under § 9-305, the pledgee can perfect his security interest in the stock
without filing a financing statement by taking possession of the stock. U.C.C § 9-305 (1978
version); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 933-35 (2d ed. 1980). The perfected security interest gives the pledgee the right to
sell the stock upon pledgor's default to satisfy pledgor's debt. See Pauly v. State Loan Ins.
& Trust Co., 165 U.S. 606, 622 (1897).
I See National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295,
1300 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, Tex., 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
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opposite conclusions as to whether federal coverage of pledge transac-
tions furthers the legislative purpose.2 2 Under the title analysis, a pledge
is considered an ordinary commercial transaction.23 Since no investors
are involved in a commercial transaction, the extension of federal anti-
fraud coverage to pledge transactions therefore would have no impact
on the protection of investors. 4
Under the statutory analysis, however, the pledgee-bank is an in-
vestor. By accepting the pledge as collateral, the bank assumes the
substantial risk that the stock will retain its original value. 5 Courts
employing the statutory analysis equate this risk with the risk an inves-
tor takes.2 Coverage of pledges by the securities acts is therefore appro-
priate under the statutory approach since the pledgee-bank is arguably
an "investor" in the pledge stock.'
The Supreme Court considered both the title analysis and the literal
statutory approach in Rubin v. United States28 and held that a pledge of
stock as collateral for a loan constituted an "offer or sale" under section
17(a) of the 1933 Act.29 In Rubin, petitioner was an officer of Tri-State
Energy, Inc., a corporation specializing in energy development.2 In
response to substantial financial pressures, Tri-State sought loans from
Bankers Trust Company. The bank loaned Tri-State 50,000 dollars with
I Compare National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d
1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978) with Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir.
1977) citing United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976).
11 See National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295,
1300 (5th Cir. 1978).
24 Id. The Fifth Circuit's observation concerning the effect of the pledge transaction on
the securities industry is an adaptation of the commercial/investment dichotomy used to
determine whether an instrument is a security. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lub-
bock, Tex., 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975). A transaction
is "investment" oriented if a person invests his money for the purpose of receiving a profit.
See C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G&G Enterprise, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1975). A
profit motivated investment transaction warrants federal security act coverage. Id. at 1363.
An ordinary commercial transaction, however, is not within the purview of federal
securities provisions. Id.
' United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
The Second Circuit noted that Congress intended the federal securities acts to protect
defrauded lenders as well as defrauded buyers. Id.
Id.; see Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 824 (2d Cir. 1977).
" Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
, 101 S. Ct. 698 (1981).
Id. at 699. Rubin is the first case in which the Supreme Court has examined the
issue of federal securities law coverage for collateral stock pledge transactions. See Appli-
cability of Rule 10b-5, supra note 7, at 557. The Court originally granted certiorari in
Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928 (1977). The Court, however, dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted subsequent to an inconsistent concession by petitioner's
counsel in oral argument. 435 U.S. 381 (1978).
1 101 S. Ct. at 694.
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the possibility of future loans contingent upon a production of financial
information by Tri-State. The financial statement which Tri-State subse-
quently provided Bankers Trust was misleading because the statement
included inflated earnings projections and an exaggerated net worth."
On the basis of the misleading financial statement, Bankers Trust pro-
vided Tri-State with an additional 425,000 dollars.
As a collateral for the loans, Tri-State pledged stock in various com-
panies apparently valued at 1.7 million dollars, but which were actually
worthless.2 Subsequently, Bankers Trust demanded full payment of the
loans. When Tri-State failed to make payment of the loans, Bankers
trust sued Tri-State on a promissory note executed in conjunction with
the loans.3 The Justice Department later indicted Rubin on counts of
violating and conspiring to violate section 17(a) of the 1933 Act as well as
other federal anti-fraud statutes. Rubin appealed his conviction on the
conspiracy count, urging that the pledge of stock as collateral for a bank
loan did not constitute an "offer or sale" under the terms of section
17(a). 4
In addressing the issue whether the pledge in question constituted a
sale, the Supreme Court adopted the literal statutory analysis and focus-
ed on the plain language of the 1933 Act. The Court first noted that the
definition of a "sale" in section 2(3) of the 1933 Act included any dispos-
tion of a security or interest in a security. The pledge agreement in
Rubin transferred to Bankers Trust the right to dispose of the pledged
stock upon Tri-State's default on the loans. 7 Accordingly, the Court ap-
31 Id. at 699. Included in the projected earnings were estimated returns from sham con-
tracts and other forged documents. Id. Rubin also made bribes to bank officers totalling
5,000 dollars, ostensibly to induce the bank to grant subsequent loans to Tri-State. Id.
32 Id. at 700. Tri-State did not own most of the stock it pledged. Id. Tri-State "rented"
stock certificates from their owners to show to the bank and went so far as to have fictitious
quotations made in an over-the-counter reporting service. Id. Much of the stock owned by
Tri-State was issued by "shell" companies. Id.
" Id. Bankers Trust also sued Rubin personally on the grounds that he guaranteed the
loans, and recovered a small percentage of its loss. Id.
34 Id.
I Id. at 701; see text accompanying notes 17-20 supra. The Rubin Court observed that
the statutory language does not control if there is a contrary expression of legislative in-
tent. Id. at 701. The Court noted that Congress adopted the definition of a "sale" from the
Uniform Sale of Securities Act, a model "blue sky" statute, which defined a sale as including
"every disposition, or attempt to dispose of a security or interest in a security for value." Id.
at 702 n.7. Prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act, one court held that a pledge of stock con-
stituted a sale under the Uniform Sale of Securities Act definition. Id. at 702; see Cecil B. De
Mille Productions, Inc. v. Woolery, 61 F.2d 45, 50 (9th Cir. 1932) (pledge of oil contracts as
collateral for a loan constituted a "sale" under Uniform Sale of Securities Act). Since the
petitioner in Rubin offered no evidence to suggest that Congress intended the definition of
a sale to have a different import under the 1933 Act, the Court held that the statutory
language controlled. 101 S. Ct. at 702.
" See 101 S. Ct. at 701; note 4 supra.
" See 101 S. Ct. at 701; note 6 supra. The Court implicitly rejected the title analysis
premise that actual foreclosure must occur for a pledge transaction to constitute a sale. See
note 14 supra.
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plied the statutory analysis and held that the disposition of this interest
by the pledgor was sufficient to bring the pledge transaction under the
purview of section 17(a) provisions regulating the fraudulent sale of
securities2
8
In Rubin, the Supreme Court indicated that the classification of a
pledge of stock as a sale under the 1933 Act was consistent with the
legislative purpose of that Act.3 9 The Court observed that Congress
designed section 17(a) to ensure the veracity of information involved in
the trading of securities." The Court noted that a pledgee-bank, like an
investor, relies upon the truthfulness of representations a pledgor
makes concerning shares of pledged stock.4' The Court, therefore, held
that the inclusion of a pledge transaction within the purview of section
17(a) furthered the purpose of ensuring the integrity of investment
security transactions.4 2
The literal statutory analysis of the issue whether a pledge of stock
is a "sale," is a departure from the Court's analysis of the analogous
issue whether an interest constitutes a "security" under the federal
securities acts.4 3 To determine whether a particular interest is a "secur-
1 101 S. Ct. at 701. The Rubin Court rejected the notion that a transfer of title is
necessary for a sale to occur. Id. The Court cited United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976), for the proposition that the disposition of an inter-
est in a security less than title would suffice for "sale" purposes. 101 S. Ct. at 701. See text
accompanying 14 supra.
101 S. Ct. at 702.
40 Id.
"1 Id. The Court equated the risk a pledgee takes that the pledged stock will retain its
value with the risk an investor takes when buying a security. Id.; see United States v. Gen-
tile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
101 S. Ct. at 702.
The 1933 Act defines a "security" as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, cer-
tificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
The 1934 Act defines a "security" in section 78(c):
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment con-
tract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general,
any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include cur-
rency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
1981]
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ity" for purpose of federal anti-fraud coverage, the Supreme Court has
employed an economic realities approach based on the substance rather
than the form of a transaction." In order to characterize the substance of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(10) (1976).
Congress intended the language of the two definitions to be similar, and courts treat the
definitions as essentially equal. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
The question what is a "security" is analogous to the issue whether a pledge is a
"sale." Both issues involve scrutiny of broad definitional sections of the securities acts. See
note 4, supra. Also, the determination of whether an interest is a "security" under the
federal securities laws is similar to a "sale" investigation "to the extent that it demands
resolution of the proper scope of the securities laws." Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604
F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, the determination that a security is present
has the same jurisdictional impact as a holding that a sale has occurred since no subject mat-
ter jurisdiction exists under the security acts if a transaction does not involve a security.
See, e.g., Fulk v. Bagley, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,640 (M.D.N.C.
1980) (subject matter jurisdiction not apparent since factual inquiry is necessary to deter-
mine whether employee benefits plan is a "security"); American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v.
U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1980) (subject matter jurisidiction lacking
since loan participation not a security); Newton, What Is a Security?: A Critical Analysis,
48 Miss. L. J. 167, 168 n.4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Critical Analysis].
See generally Fitzgibbon, What Is A Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility
to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); Sonnenschein, Federal
Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW
1567 (1980); Stansburg & Bedol, Interests in Employee Benefit Plans as Securities: Daniel
(International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Danie 99S. Ct. 790) and Beyond, 3 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 83 (1980).
" See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). In Forman, the Court held that shares
of stock entitling purchasers to lease apartments in a state subsidized, non-profit housing
cooperative did not constitute securities under the economic realities of the transaction. 421
U.S. at 847. Initially discounting the argument that the shares constituted "stock," the
Court explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's literal statutory approach of the problem. See
421 U.S. at 848; Deacon and Pendergast, Defining a "Security" After the Forman Decision,
11 PAC. L. J. 213, 218 (1980). The Court instead noted that the shares lacked characteristics
common to stock such as free negotiability and the possibility of appreciation in value and
held that the shares were not stock under the "security" definition. See 421 U.S. at 849. The
Court next considered the claim that the shares represented an "investment contract." Id.
at 851; see SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 292, 298-99 (1946) ("investment contract" is any
scheme involving "an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others"). In dismissing the petitioners' contention, the Court noted
that the petitioners made no investment for profit. 421 U.S. at 853. The petitioners bought
the housing shares out of a desire for low cost housing. Id. at 859.
In Daniel, the Court examined whether a non-contributory, compulsory pension plan
was a security under the federal securities acts. 439 U.S. at 553. As in Forman, the Court
looked to the economic realities of the transaction and held that an employee's motivation in
accepting employment is not the desire to invest in a pension plan, but rather the desire to
earn a living. Id. at 561. The Court indicated that an employment contract is not a true in-
vestment contract under the Howey text. Id.
The Rubin Court's emphasis on the literal statutory language marks a change in the
Court's analysis of federal securities acts definitional problems. See Securities Regulation,
supra note 5, at 245. In Forman, the Court explicitly rejected a literal approach in defining a
security. 421 U.S. at 849-50. Instead, the Court stated that since securities transactions
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a transaction, the Court has focused on the economic inducement for the
transaction as evidenced by the motivation of the parties involved.45 If a
person gives up a separable financial interest for the purpose of gaining
profits, then the transaction is an investment transaction covered by the
federal securities acts." Conversely, a person who is motivated by con-
cerns other than the possibility of profits is not an investor and
therefore outside the coverage of the federal securities acts."
The economic realities analysis is a sounder approach than either the
literal statutory analysis or the title approach for determining whether a
pledge of stock constitutes a sale under the federal securities acts. The
economic realities test better implements the legislative intent of the
1933 and 1934 Acts" of protecting investors from fraud.49 To further the
purpose of the acts, any analysis of securities transactions therefore
must identify "investors," as those persons Congress sought to protect
because of their vulnerability to fraud. The economic realities approach
correctly identifies investors by examining the motives of the parties in-
volved." Under the economic realities approach, a person who enters
into a transaction with an expectation of profit qualifies as an investor
were economic in character, Congress intended the application of the securities acts to turn
on the economic realities underlying the transaction. Id. at 849; see also Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 325 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). Further-
more, the Court noted that the Second Circuit is the only circuit that has not rejected a
literal approach. 421 U.S. at 849.
'5 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979); United Hous.
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
"8 United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975). The Forman Court
noted that the possibility of tangential "investment" benefits did not satisfy the economic
realities test. Id. at 854-57. The Second Circuit held that shareholders derived profits from
rental reductions resulting from the income derived from Co-Op City commercial facilities,
from tax deductions, and from savings resulting from the subsidized nature of the develop-
ment. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1254-55 (2d Cir. 1974). The For-
man Court held that these benefits did not constitute investment profits because the
benefits were essential services, not returns on investments. 421 U.S. at 857.
' 421 U.S. at 858.
" See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
,9 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); Lincoln Nat'l Bank
v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1979); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933).
In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the Court recently examined the pur-
pose of the securities acts. In Naftalin, the respondent engaged in fraudulent practices in
the purchase of securities and was subsequently convicted under section 17(a) of the 1933
Act. Id. at 770-71. Respondent appealed his conviction on the grounds that his fraud injured
a broker, not an investor. The respondent contended that the purpose of the securities acts
was to protect investors and therefore the injury to the broker was not a violation of 17(a).
Id. The Court rejected respondent's arguments and held that the purpose of the act was not
limited solely to protecting investors, but was also intended to "achieve a high standard of
business ethics ... in every facet of the securities industry." 441 U.S. at 755, citing SEC v.
Capital Gains Bureau. 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963).
" See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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entitled" to federal securities act protection. 1 Neither the literal
statutory approach nor the title analysis, however, discriminates be-
tween investors and non-investors.2 The title and statutory approaches
instead concentrate on the mechanics of the transactions by focusing
solely on the transfer of title or any interest in a security.5 By failing to
distinguish between investors and non-investors, the title and statutory
analyses do not implement the Act's legislative purpose of protecting in-
vestors.
The economic realities approach is a more desirable analysis to the
issue whether a pledge of stock is a sale than the statutory and title
analyses because the realities approach is more flexible. Under the title
or statutory approaches, a sale occurs whenever there is a transfer of
title or a disposition of an interest in a security. 4 By focusing on the
motivatfon of the parties, however, the economic realities analysis takes
into account such factors as the economic setting of the transaction 5 and
the expectations of the parties concerning federal securities law
coverage. 6 A commercial setting for a transaction indicates that a party
is not making an investment for profit. 7 The absense of an expectation
by a party that federal securities laws apply to a transaction also
mitigates the finding of an investment motive. 8 The realities analysis,
therefore, enables a court to decide each case on the facts instead of re-
quiring the court to apply a rigid, statutory or title-based analysis that
can possibly lead to absurd results.
Under the economic realities approach, the pledge transaction in
Rubin did not constitute a sale. In Rubin, the commercial setting of the
pledge was entirely commercial since the pledge was made in the con-
text of a commercial loan. The commercial nature of the pledge indicates
51 Id.
See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
Id. The effect of the failure to distinguish investors from non-investors is to extend
federal securities act coverage to transactions unintended by Congress. See Lincoln Nat'l
Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1979). In Herber, the Seventh Circuit adopted
a context over text analysis to determine whether a pledge of stock was a sale of a security.
Id. at 1041. Although the court noted that a pledge qualifies as a sale under a strict reading
of the securities acts' definitions, the court held that the economic realities controlled. Id.
Since the pledge is a commercial transaction, the court held that protection of such a trans-
action would not serve the legislative purpose of protecting investors. Id.; see generally
Comment, Caveat Lender-Federal Securities Law Does Not Apply to a Commercial Loan
Secured By A Pledge of Securities, 56 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1227 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Caveat Lender].
" See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
" See note 11 supra.
I See United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975). In Forman,
the Court implied that if the parties to a transaction realistically expected that federal
securities laws would apply to the transaction an investment motive would likely be pre-
sent. Id.
67 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
See note 57 supra.
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that the parties could not realistically expect federal securities laws to
apply. Furthermore, the motivation of the parties to the pledge was to
secure a commercial loan. 9 Neither the pledgor nor the pledgee parted
with a financial interest for the purpose of obtaining economic gain.
Although the pledgee-bank took a risk that the pledge securities would
retain their value, the risk was not in anticipation of profits. 0 Moreover,
the presence of the risk that the stock will decline in value does not alter
the commercial, non-investment nature of the transaction." Consequent-
ly, in view of the economic realties, extension of federal securities act
coverage to the pledge of stock in Rubin is inappropriate.
The effect of the Rubin decision is to extend the scope of federal
securities anti-fraud protection. After Rubin, pledges of stock as col-
lateral for commercial loans will constitute "sales" and therefore fall
within the coverage of federal anti-fraud provisions. Rubin's expansion
of anti-fraud coverage is inconsistent with the recent trend of Supreme
Court decisions limiting the scope of Securities Act coverage."
Moreover, the availability of adequate state remedies obviates the need
for federal protection of pledges of stock. The commercial nature of the
pledge also necessitates the exclusion of stock pledges from the purview
of federal securities law. 4 Nevertheless, the Rubin Court's treatment of
a pledge of stock as a sale will have the desirable effect of discouraging
fraudulent activities in connection with pledges of stock, making such
pledges a commercially safe mode of securing loans.
JOHN KENT PEARSON
See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra; Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d
1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1979). The Herber court noted that the risk taken by the pledgee-bank in
a pledge of stock as collateral is an ordinary commercial risk takefi by all secured lenders.
Id.
' See id. Upon the pledgor's default on a loan, the pledgor-bank must sell the pledged
stock to satisfy the debt. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1978 version). The pledgee-bank has to account to
the pledgor for any proceeds in excess of the debt. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1978 version). The
pledgee-bank cannot benefit from any increase in the stock's value, and any investment in
the stock for profit is therefore impossible. See id.
61 See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1979).
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 567 (1979) (no private cause of ac-
tion under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 US.. 462, 473-74
(1977) (10(b) fraud must be manipulative or deceptive); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter necessary for 10(b) claim); Blue Chip Stamps y. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (10(b) coverage limited to actual purchases or sellers); Securities
Regulation, supra note 5, at 246; Caveat Lender, supra note 54, at 1246 n.136.
11 See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 1979). Under § 9-504
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the pledgee-bank can sue the pledgor for any difference in
value between the pledged stock and the amount of the debt. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1978
version). Furthermore, the pledgee-bank has a state common law remedy for fraud and a
possible remedy under state "blue sky" laws. See note 5 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 46-48 & 60-62 supra.
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